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THE E-SIGN ACT OF 2000: THE TRIUMPH OF




On June 30, 2000, President Clinton inserted a signature card
into a computer and became the first President to electronically sign a
bill into law.' With the President's point-and-click, the Electronic Sig-
natures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-Sign)2 descended
onto the legal landscape, giving federally recognized legal effect to
electronic signatures.3
With this newsworthy method of signing the Act into law,4 Presi-
dent Clinton vividly demonstrated that the age of electronic signa-
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2002; BA., summa am
laude, DePauw University, 1999. I would like to thank Professor Cathleen Kaveny for
her helpful comments on earlier drafts of this work and all of my friends at the Notre
Dame Law Review for their prodigious editing efforts. Most importantly, I uish to
thank my wife, Jenni Morgan Hays, for her unending encouragement and support.
1 See Electronic Signatures Given Legal Standing, N.Y. TmEs, July 1, 2000, at C3.
2 Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114 Stat. 464 (2000) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 7001-7006 (2000)).
3 "Electronic signatures," as used in this Note, draus from E-Sign's definition of
that term: "an electronic sound, symbol, or process, attached to or logically associated
with a contract or other record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent
to sign the record." 15 U.S.G.S. § 7006(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2001). For present
purposes, note that this broad definition encompasses the more precise term, "digital
signature." For further discussion of digital signatures, see infra notes 77-86 and ac-
companying text.
4 Note that as most provisions of E-Sign did not take effect until October 1, 2000,
see § 107(a), 114 Stat. at 473, the President also hand-signed a paper version of the
bill. See Electronic Signatures Given Legal Standing, supra note 1, at CS.
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tures is finally upon us. Through the passage of E-Sign, Congress
bravely ushered us into that age, or so the story goes. The conven-
tional wisdom runs something like this: the Internet has revolution-
ized commerce and business transactions, increasingly making the
conventions and laws of contracting outmoded; as the "e-sector" grows
and takes on more complicated and sophisticated transactions, busi-
ness people and other transactors fear (or feared) that their elec-
tronic transactions take place in a state of legal limbo; therefore, some
degree of certainty is required, and the certainty ought to be uniform
on a national, if not global, scale. As one observer explained, "Here is
the key policy problem: American business is eager to get rid of paper
contracts... ." But "[b] efore electronic commerce can reach its full
potential, business must be provided assurance that traditional signa-
ture law encompasses electronic authentication."' Enter the E-Sign
Act.
The substitution of electronic for handwritten signatures might
seem like a legal non-event. After all, society has witnessed the substi-
tution of shopping in bookstores for amazon.com; it has accepted e-
mail as a valid and often more convenient substitute for posted mail;
and society recognizes online stock-market trades as a preferable sub-
stitute for dealing with brokerage firms. Electronic signatures could
be viewed as a correlative legal development of little consequence. In-
deed, the abstract concept of electronic signatures makes great sense.
But legislation is not an abstract concept; new laws are rarely thought
of as non-events, and the commentary surrounding the Act's passage
underscores its perceived significance. Just weeks before the Act was
passed, then-Senator Spencer Abraham commented on E-Sign, saying,
"I have become more convinced than ever that this legislation will rev-
olutionize the way consumers, industry, and government conduct bus-
iness over the Internet."6 This Note examines E-Sign's impact from
the perspective of more traditional contract law concerns.
Before thoroughly examining the Act, however, one might ques-
tion these claims of importance by reference to certain elementary
5 Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce (E-Sign) Act: Hearings on
H.R. 1714 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 33, 35 (1999) (statement of David Peyton, Director of Technol-
ogy Policy for the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM)) (quoting from a
NAM letter to Senator Abraham).
6 Andrew J. Glass, Electronic Signatures May Soon Bind, AuStIN ANI.-STATErNIAN,
June 14, 2000, at D5; see alsoJuliet Eilperin &John Schwartz, Electronic Signatures Bill
Passes the House: Measure Could Spur Online Commerce, WAs-i. PosT, June 15, 2000, at Al
(reporting that E-Sign is "hailed by backers as one of the most significant pieces of
high-tech legislation of this legislative session").
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principles of law. For example, is a statute authorizing electronic sig-
natures really even necessary? The Uniform Commercial Code, a ver-
sion of which governs commercial transactions in most states, 7 defines
a signature as "any symbol executed or adopted by a party with pre-
sent intention to authenticate a writing."8 That definition is seem-
ingly broad enough to encompass an electronic signature. 9 Moreover,
even admitting that electronic signing is an area ripe for statutory ac-
tion does not explain why America needs a federal act. After all, con-
tract law is typically considered a province of the states, t ° and many
laws on the subject pre-date E-Sign.11
Thus, a number of other assumptions underlie the adoption of E-
Sign and its importance: conventional wisdom holds that the Internet
is uniquely market-driven and that so far as is practicable, government
should avoid trying to regulate it. Specifically, calls for "bottom-up,"
7 SeeAL-AN ScWARTZ ROBERT E. ScoTrT, S.uS Luv AND TiE CON-RING PRo-
c.ss 2 (2d ed. 1991) (reporting that the U.C.C. "has been adopted in every state
(except Articles 2 and 6 in Louisiana), and in the District of Columbia").
8 U.C.C. § 1-201(39) (1989).
9 The "symbol" part of the definition is extremely broad, and I think an elec-
tronic signature, however defined, would likely fall under it. Further, tie U.C.C.'s
requirement of a "writing" may also be fulfilled by an electronic transaction. See In re
RealNetworks, Inc., Privacy Litig., No. OOC 1366, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6584, at *11
(N.D. Ill. May 11, 2000) (holding that an electronic license agreement satisfies the
Federal Arbitration Act's requirement of a written agreement); see also infra notes
37-48 and accompanying text (discussing the Reaelredorhs case in greater detail); ef.
15 U.S.C.S. § 7006(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2001) (defining electronic signature as "an
electronic sound, symbol, or process, attached to or logically associated vith a con-
tract or other record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the
record").
10 See Sanu K. Thomas, Note, The Protection and Promotion of E-Commerce: Should
There Be a Global Regulatoty Schane for Digital Signatures?, 22 Fob.Di-Lt INtr'. LJ. 1002,
1026-27 (1999) ("[T]raditionally in the United States, issues of enforceability and au-
thenticity of signatures and agreements are primarily governed by state and not fed-
eral law.") (citing Robert G. Ballen & Thomas A. Fox, Electronic Banhing Products and
Services: The New Legal Issues, 115 BANFING LJ. 334, 339 (1998)).
11 Prior to 2000, a number of states had enacted some form of electronic or digi-
tal signature statute. The first was Utah, in 1995. &e UTAH CODE AN. §§ 46-3-101 to
46-3-602 (1998 & Supp. 2000). For a comprehensive look at state electronic signature
law, see UPDATE: Survey of State Electronic and Digital Signature Legislative Initiathes, at
http://wv.ilpf.org/digsig/update.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2001) (stating that all
states except Arkansas, South Carolina, and South Dakota "have considered or en-
acted some form of electronic authentication law"). In addition to state legislatures,
non-governmental bodies have also been busy uith electronic signature legislation.
See, e.g., Digital Signature Guidelines, 1996 A.B.A. SEC. Sci. & TEcn. INFO. SEC. Co.w.tf.,
available at http://wv.abanet.org/scitech/home.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2001); see
also UNit. ELS c. TRAN CIONs Acr §§ 1-20, 7A pt. 1 U.LA. 17 (Supp. 2000) [herein-
after UETA].
2001] II85
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
"minimalist," and "technology-neutral" legislation dominated the
Congressional hearings on E-Sign. 12 It seems that Congress's goal was
to create a better electronic signature law and, in so doing, to satiate
the seemingly conflicting goals of the Internet world: assurance of le-
gal validity and lack of regulation. Insofar as those interests can be
reconciled, E-Sign addresses both of them. The Act presents very
straightforWard conditions for legal validity13 while simultaneously re-
maining minimalist14 and deferring to the recognized role of the
states in contract law.15 At bottom, the Act appears to be an effort to
promote electronic commerce through a comprehensive, national
law.'
6
12 The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act: Hearings on 1I.R.
1714 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the
House Commerce Comm., 106th Cong. 19, 22 (1999) (statement of Donald W. Upson,
Secretary of Technology, Commonwealth of Virginia) ("Where governmental involve-
ment is needed, its aim should be to support and enforce a predictable, minimal-
ist.., and simple legal environment for commerce."); see also id. at 28 (statement of
Daniel Greenwood, Deputy General Counsel, House Commerce Committee) (calling
for a "minimalist, non-regulatory, and technology-neutral stance").
13 See 15 U.S.C.S. § 7001(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2001) ("[A] signature, con-
tract, or other record relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect,
validity, or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form.").
14 The Act sets out virtually no "positive" requirements or regulatory provisions;
rather, it operates in the negative by saying electronic signatures, contracts, and the
like "may not be denied legal effect." Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Act's defi-
nition of electronic signature sets a minimal standard. See id. § 7006(5).
15 Section 102 of the Act, id. § 7002, defines the extent to which the Act preempts
state law, expressly allowing states the opportunity to create their own electronic sig-
nature regimes so long as they are either consistent with E-Sign or amount to a whole-
sale adoption of the UTEA. See id.
16 See Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce (E-Sign) Act: Hearings on
HP. 1714 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 29, 31 (1999) (statement of Scott Cooper, Manager for Tech-
nology Policy, Hewlett-Packard Company) ("The continued growth of electronic com-
merce depends on the development of a legal framework of electronic contract law
that will supply uniformity and legal certainty to transactions in the electronic market-
place."); id. at 5 (statement of Howard Coble, Chairman, Subcommittee on Courts
and Intellectual Property, Committee on the Judiciary) ("Industry representatives a-
sert that the differences and the lack of legislation between States are an impediment
to the growth of e-commerce . . . ."); The Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act: Hearings on H.R. 1714 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Trade,
and Consumer Protection of the House Commerce Comm., 106th Cong. 19, 21 (1999) (state-
ment of Donald W. Upson, Secretary of Technology, Commonwealth of Virginia)
("Sound policy ... is essential for both the Internet and on-line commerce to reach
their full potential."); id. at 28 (statement of Daniel Greenwood, Deputy General
Counsel for the Information Technology Division, Commonwealth of Massachusetts)
("[I]t seems clear that the objectives of this legislation are wholly consistent with the
1186 [VOL- 76:4
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If in fact E-Sign represents a well-calculated attempt to promote
e-commerce, it will probably succeed. As one observer explained,
"[T]his new law sends a message to the business community that e-
signatures are O.K.'u7 If nothing else, the Act should increase busi-
ness simply because a Congressional statement on legal ,alidity em-
boldens those who feared the "legal uncertainty" of electronic
signatures. But what of the legal consequences of the Act? If E-Sign is
as important as many claim, one would expect it to have greater im-
pact than promoting business. And indeed it does. This Note ex-
plores the legal impact of the Act's provisions regarding signatures. E-
Sign covers more than just electronic signatures,'8 but as the popular
name implies, the thrust of the Act is on signing documents and mak-
ing them legally binding without using paper or pen. Thus, E-Sign
falls generally into the realm of contract law and specifically into the
law of formalities.
Every first-year law student knows that a contract, at its simplest, is
formed by mutual assent plus consideration.' 9 Nothing about this
traditional understanding involves signatures, and in many cases a
contract may be legally valid without either a signature or a written
document.20 Signed, written agreements are nonetheless required in
many cases. Sometimes the transacting parties require a signature be-
cause they wish to have some record of the agreement for future use.
Sometimes the law of a state or other jurisdiction requires that con-
Commonwealth's policy to assure a sound foundation for electronic commerce.").
This theme, which runs throughout the Congressional testimony is echoed in the law
review literature. See, eg., Thomas, supra note 10, at 1005 ("E-Commerce will achieve
its full potential only if a modem legal infrastructure exists .... ); Stephen Leal
Tupper, Note, From Seal to Cyber-Notaiy: Uncertainty in Electronic Commerce and the Casefor
a Digital Signature Law in Michigan, 45 WAYNE L. RE%,. 237, 238 (1999) ("Parties seeking
to enter into contracts by electronic means face uncertainty .... This condition can
chill commerce ....").
17 BamabyJ. Feder, E-Signing Lau, Seen as a Boon to E-Bnsiness, N.Y. TniEs, July 4,
2000, at C1 (quoting Kevin M. Coleman, Internet Security Specialist for KPMG); see
also Eilperin & Schwartz, supra note 6, at Al (arguing that E-Sign "could set the stage
for a dramatic expansion of e-commerce beyond such activities as buying books and
CDs online").
18 The Act provides that "a signature, contract, or other record... may not be denied
legal effect." 15 U.S.C.S. § 7001(a) (1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2001) (emphasis added).
19 See CHARLES L NAPP Er A, PROBLE-MS IN CoNTImcr Lxw, G,sEs ,ND IATERM.
ALS 95 (4th ed. 1999) (noting that Anglo-American law requires consideration in or-
der to make mutually assented to promises enforceable).
20 See, e.g., Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256, 259 (N.Y. 1891) (upholding an oral
promise to pay $5000 as a binding contract).
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tracts be either written or signed, or both.2 1 In either case, whether
required by law or by agreement, the writing and the signature are
formalities-something required in addition to the baseline defini-
tion of contract in order to "formalize" the agreement.2 2 E-Sign gives
us a new formality: the electronic signature. Perhaps the most famous
and most instructive discussion of the uses and importance of legal
formalities is Professor Lon Fuller's Consideration and Form,23 pub-
lished in 1941. Long before the Internet, renowned legal scholars set
their minds to examining and explaining the importance of formality
in the law.24 It is to Professor Fuller's timeless work that this Note
turns for examining E-Sign.
Before an examination is in order, however, one requires a care-
ful understanding of the Act and the law of signatures more broadly.
Accordingly, Part I of this Note explores the limited case law dealing
with electronic signatures, as well as the ways in which the common
law of contracts has adapted to previous technological innovations.
This Part will seek to ascertain what general legal principles, if any,
might appropriately govern the law of electronic signatures. Part II
continues by examining the major statutory approaches to electronic
signature law. This Part will outline the provisions of E-Sign in detail
and analyze the two competing philosophies of electronic signature
legislation. 25 Part III will build upon the legal frameworks previously
21 This is the Statute of Frauds. Although state formulations of the Statute vary,
two common statements of this ancient writing requirement can be found in RSrATt:.
MENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 110 (1981) and U.C.C. § 2-201 (1989). In general,
the Statute provides that certain classes of contracts will not be enforced unless "there
is a written memorandum." RrSTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACrS § 110 (1981).
22 In the law of contracts, formalities such as written documents and signatures
are often invoked voluntarily. However, in other fields of law (and in contracts that
fall under the Statute of Frauds) formalities are legally required. In the required
context, "formality" means something like non-substantive, mandatory legal rules.
However, Iuse the term to mean non-substantive legal conventions of a mandatory or
voluntary nature.
23 Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799 (1941).
24 In addition to Fuller's important work, see Duncan Kennedy, Form and Sub.
stance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685, 1738-66 (1976); Duncan
Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 358-59 (1973); and Richard A. Posner,
Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 411, 419-20 (1977).
25 More than two electronic signature laws have been passed in this country, see
supra note 11, but they seem to fall (with varying degrees of congruence) into two
major categories. The first, I call the "Uniform Law Approach." Laws in this model
draw their philosophical underpinnings (if not their precise textual provisions) from
the UETA, a product of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Law. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. E-Sign is a Uniform Law Ap-
proach statute. Compare 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 7001-7006 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2001), will
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examined and assess each as a legal formality. Finally, the Note con-
cludes that E-Sign, though well suited to its e-business aims, fails to
preserve many of the formal functions historically important to con-
tract law.
I. CouRT CASES: THE COMMON LAW's APPROACH
TO ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES
Currently, there is very little case law dealing ith electronic sig-
natures. In fact, the bulk of existing disputes involve patent contro-
versies over competing signature technology.2 6  However, a few
electronic signature cases touch on some aspects of contract law and
offer a hint into how E-Sign will impact the legal landscape. In addi-
tion to the limited law of electronic signatures, one might find a ready
analogy, or set of guiding principles, in the case law addressing other
technological advances. The common law would appear to be a ripe
ground for creation of electronic signature law because, as Louis
Brandeis once wrote, "the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to
meet the demands of society."2 7 We shall see, however, that the cases
provide an unsatisfactory resolution and merely underscore the per-
ceived necessity behind Congress's passage of E-Sign.
A. The Case Law of Past Technological Innovations
Courts seeking guidance in assessing electronic signatures might
look to judicial treatment of past technological innovations on the
"ink-and-pen" contract. Although such an examination provides an
interesting lesson in history, modem courts addressing the validity of
electronic documents and signatures have not utilized it.28
UETA, supra note 11, §§ 1-20. The second view of electronic signature laws I call the
"ABA Approach." Statutes in this model hew closely to the American Bar Associa-
tion's Digital Signature Guideline. See Digital Signature Guiddines, supra note 11, av, aila-
ble at http://www.abanet.org/scitech/home.html; see also infra notes 75-86 and
accompanying text.
26 See, e.g., Voice Techs. Group, Inc. v. VMC S)s., Inc., 164 F.3d 605, 616 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (reversing a grant of summaryjudgrnent on a technology dispute involving
"telephone emulation" as a sort of electronic signature); Surety Techs. v. Entrust
Techs., Inc., 71 F. Supp. 2d 520 (E.D. Va. 1999) (addressing an infringement claim
surrounding digital time-stamping of documents); Schlafly v. Pub. Key Partners, No.
94-20512 SW, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15251 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 1997) (addressing an
infringement controversy between competing digital signature techniques).
27 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Pikac, '4 HAv. L REV.
193, 193 (1890).
28 See infra Part I.B.
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Perhaps the first innovation on a traditional contract was an
agreement signed in pencil. In Executors of Clason v. Bailey,2 9 the New
York Court for the Correction of Errors upheld a pencil-signed con-
tract, asking, "[W] hat have we to do with the kind of instrument which
the parties employed... ?"30 In a discussion of historical techniques
for "express[ing] our ideas by letters visible to the eye," 31 the court
intimated thatjudges and lawmakers have no place defining the tech-
nology appropriate to contract formation. Rather, in the court's
words, "This has been left to be governed by public convenience and
usage; and as far as questions have arisen on this subject, the courts
have, with great latitude and liberality, left the parties to their own
discretion."
32
This view would easily support common-law acceptance of elec-
tronic signatures and would obviate the need for legislative action.
Indeed, the technological innovations beyond the use of' pencils in
1817 have met with similar approval. Courts have upheld the use of
telegrams in contract formation since at least 1867,33 and the case law
has not wavered on this point.3 4 Much like telegrams, the use of fac-
simile machines in place of traditional documents does not seem to
raise serious evidentiary concerns.3 5 In general, the judicial approach
to non-traditional documents and writings seems to follow the Clason
court's image of "great latitude and liberality." However, the transi-
tion to computers has proved more complicated. One court has
clearly distinguished computer-generated evidence from facsimiles,16
and, as the following paragraphs show, the judicial approach to com-
puter-generated signatures is extremely varied.
29 14Johns. 484 (N.Y. 1817), 1817 N.Y. LEXIS 136.
30 Id. at 491, 1817 N.Y. LEXIS 136, at "14-15.
31 Id., 1817 N.Y. LEXIS 136, at *15.
32 I., 1817 N.Y. LEXIS 136, at ':16.
33 Trevor v. Wood, 36 N.Y. 307, 310 (1867), 1867 N.Y. LEXIS 47, at 1 7 (holding
that because the parties agreed to communicate by telegram, "the sending of the
dispatch must be regarded as an acceptance of the respondents' offer").
34 See, e.g., Petroleum, Inc. v. Liberty Petroleum Corp., 505 F.2d 1384, 1385 (6111
Cir. 1974) ("[T]he correspondence, cablegrams and telegrams passing between the
parties were sufficient to take the case out of the operation of the Ohio statute of
frauds.").
35 See, e.g., People v. Hagan, 556 N.E.2d 1224, 1239-40 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (hold-
ing that admission of a faxed document into evidence was proper without a founda-
tion concerning the reliability of the fax equipment; analogizing to telegrams, the
authenticity of which may be shown by indirect and circumstantial evidence) (citing
29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 883 (1967)).
36 See id. at 1238-39 ("In the case of computer records, this court has held that
foundation proof is required to show that the generating system was standard, un-
modified, and properly operated.").
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B. The Case Law of Electronic Signatures
A notable step towards the "liberalizing" approach to electronic
signatures can be found in In re RealNetworks, Inc., Privaty Litigation.
3 7
In that case, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois held that an electronic license agreement could amount to
a '"riting" within the meaning of the Federal Arbitration Act.3 'I The
RealNetworks case grew out of a privacy controversy involving two In-
ternet-based products: RealPlayer and RealJukebox.39 The plaintiff
class complained that installing these products allowed RealNetworks
to secretly intercept information from users' computers.4 '
RealNetvorks sought and obtained an order to compel arbitration,
consistent with the products' license agreements." Subsequently,
David Keel intervened as a party plaintiff and presented additional
arguments in opposition to arbitration.42 Along with other theories,
Keel argued that the arbitration clause in RealNetwvorks's license
agreements was unenforceable because it was not "written."43 The
Federal Arbitration Act requires that agreements to arbitrate be writ-
ten in order to be enforceable. 44 Keel argued that because the agree-
ment to arbitrate was in electronic form, it could not satisfy the Act's
standard.45 Even without E-Sign, the court disagreed, noting that
Congress's then current discussions over E-Sign address only "the 'un-
certain! legal effect of an electronic record or an electronic signa-
ture."46 Based on this reasoning, the court decided that it could
resolve the present uncertainty without Congressional action, and it
concluded that Congress's use of the term "written" in 1925 encom-
passes an electronic transmission on a computer screen.47 Despite
this conclusion, the court was careful to note, "the Court does not
now find that all electronic communications may be considered 'wit-
37 No. 00C 1366, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6584 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2000).
38 See id. at *11; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (requiring that enforceable agree-
ments to arbitrate must be written).
39 In re RealNetworks, Inc., Privacy Litig., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6584, at *2.
40 Id at *I.
41 See Lieschke v. RealNetworks, Inc., No. 99C 7274, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 1683
(N.D. IIl. Feb. 11, 2000), cited in In re RealNetworks, Inc., Privacy Litig., 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6584, at *2.
42 See In re RealNetvorks, Inc., Privacy Litig., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6584, at *2
43 Id. at *3. The "agreement" appears on the computer screen in a pop-up win-
dow during installation of the software, and a user "agrees" to its terms as part of tie
installation process. See id. at *8.
44 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
45 In re RealNetworks, Inc., Privacy Litig., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6584, at *5.
46 Id. at *10-11 (emphasis added) (citing H.R. RE'. No. 106-341 (1) (1999)).
47 See i& at *6-8.
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ten.' Rather, the Court examines the contract at issue in this
action .... "48
The hesitancy of the RealNetworks court is echoed in the law con-
cerning electronic formation of contracts. In Ballas v. Tedesco,19 a fed-
eral district court held, "[T]he exchange of e-mails, however, does not
satisfy the statutory requirement of a written instrument signed by the
Defendants."50 Yet, in Barman v. Union Oil Co.,5 1 another federal dis-
trict court ruled that "numerous e-mail messages and memoranda"
amounted to "other writings constituting a contract."5 2 Although
there are some factual differences in the cases, 53 they still reach funda-
mentally opposite results. Even the limited judicial response to elec-
tronic transactions makes it clear that the concern over the "legal
uncertainty of an electronic signature"5 4 was a valid one. On this
front, the common law is inconclusive.
I. THE E-SIGN ACT: ITS PROVISIONS AND ITS PREDECESSORS
With the case law inconclusive, legislative action seemed the most
appropriate method for addressing the need for "a regime of elec-
tronic signatures that has both legal certainty and widespread con-
sumer acceptance . . . ,,55 E-Sign is probably the most dramatic
48 Id. at *8.
49 41 F. Supp. 2d 531 (D.NJ. 1999).
50 Id. at 541.
51 No. 97-563-AS, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13973 (D. Or. Aug. 13, 1999) (unpub-
lished opinion).
52 Id. at *28.
53 The differences are less obvious than one might imagine. In Barman, defen-
dant Union Oil Company and Mr. Barman were involved in lengthy negotiations over
the purchase of filling station properties and equipment. See id. at *4-13. Some of
that negotiation involved the exchange of e-mails and the preparation of intra-office
e-mails. Id. at *8-9. In holding that a contract was formed, the court considered the
exchange of e-mail messages as one part of a larger course of negotiations. See id. at
*28. In Ballas, by contrast, the parties negotiated a "deal" (the court's words) to pro-
duce a music CD through the exchange of e-mails over a period of nine months. See
Ballas, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 534 & n.5. After the business relationship broke down, the
parties' subsequent actions led to a copyright dispute. Id. at 534. Plaintiffs con-
tended, among other things, that the exchanged e-mails granted them an exclusive
license to market the recordings. Id. at 541. The court disagreed, holding that ex-
changed e-mails were insufficient to form such a contract. Id.
54 H.R RE. No. 106-341, pt. 1, at 7 (1999), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/
cp106/cp06query.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2001).
55 Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce (E-Sign) Act: Hearings on
H.R. 1714 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 29, 31 (1999) (statement of Scott Cooper, Manager for Tech-
nology Policy, Hewlett-Packard Company).
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legislative action to date. However, it is not the only attempt at elec-
tronic signature law. The following paragraphs will explore the spe-
cific provisions of E-Sign and contrast the Act with a philosophically
different legal regime, the Utah Digital Signature Act.
A. The Provisions of E-Sign
The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act
is sub-divided into two titles. The first governs "Electronic Records
and Signatures in Commerce,"5 6 and the second pertains to "Transfer-
able Records."57 This Note's exploration of electronic signatures nec-
essarily focuses on Title 1.58 Section 101 of that title spells out the
General Rule of Validity- Notwithstanding any statute, regulation, or
other rule of law... with respect to any transaction in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce-a signature, contract, or other re-
cord relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect,
validity, or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form.5 9
As mentioned previously, this "General Rule of Validity" does not
provide any positive requirements for a legally valid signature.
Though the Act contains many more provisions, none expand upon
the electronic signature concept except for the equally vague defini-
tion of an electronic signature: "an electronic sound, symbol, or pro-
cess, attached to or logically associated with a contract or other record
and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the re-
cord."60 This lack of specificity is due to Congress's acceptance of the
legal philosophy embodied in the Uniform Electronic Transactions
Act.6 ' Because of its origins, this vague philosophy of electronic signa-
tures could be called the "Uniform Law Approach."6 - This approach
56 See 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 7001-7006 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2001).
57 See id. § 7021.
58 See Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, Pub. L No.
106-229, §§ 101-107, 114 Stat. 464 (2000) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-7006
(2000)).
59 15 U.S.C.S. § 7001(a).
60 Id. § 7006(5).
61 Most of the provisions of the UETA, supra note 11, are the same as those of E-
Sign. For example, Section VII of the Uniform Act provides, "A record or signature
may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic
form." See UETA, supra note 11, § 7(a). Additionally, despite its greater length,
UETA offers no more insight than E-Sign as to what constitutes a legally valid elec-
tronic signature. Perhaps the only relevant provision of UETA not copied in E-Sign
explains: "This [Act] applies only to transactions between parties eacl of which has
agreed to conduct transactions by electronic means." Id. § 5(b).
62 I have labeled this philosophy "Uniform Law Approach" for convenient identi-
fication. When I discuss the "philosophy" of this approach, I make no pretense of
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believes that the private sector can determine the specifics of elec-
tronic signatures in the laboratory of the marketplace.
63
The Uniform Law Approach has no intention of specifying the
contours of a legal signature beyond a simple statement that they are
valid.64 What is particularly illuminating about this approach, how-
ever, at least as embodied in E-Sign, is its list of exceptions. Among
other things, E-Sign does not apply to wills, transactions pertaining to
adoption, court orders, notices of the cancellation of utility services,
and notices of the cancellation of health insurance. 65 The common
thread among each of these exceptions is their extreme importance.
Loss of health insurance, dispensation of assets upon death, adoption,
and the like are legal events with severe, often irrevocable, and in-
tensely personal consequences. In recognition of this, the Act does
not permit these transactions to occur solely on the basis of an elec-
tronic signature. Professor Fuller would explain these exceptions by
reference to his "cautionary function."66 To put it simply, important
transactions require a "circumspective frame of mind,"6 7 and by ex-
cepting certain important transactions, E-Sign impliedly admits that
its legal regime, one that revolves around a casual understanding of
"signature," fails to preserve the "legalism" of some important
speaking on behalf of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. Rather, I offer as an act's "philosophy," my deductions from the textual provi-
sions and other reasonable inferences based on the legislative history of E-Sign.
63 See The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act: Hearings on H.L
1714 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the
House Commerce Comm., 106th Cong. 19, 30 (1999) (statement of Daniel Greenwood,
Deputy General Counsel for the Information Technology Division, Commonwealth of
Massachusetts) ("Ultimately, as national standards and practices emerge, they will be
based upon actual proven market experience and they will be far better than any
scheme anyone can dream up today through central planning.").
64 See id. (favoring the "minimalist" approach of E-Sign) ("In narrow cases where
legislation is dealing with specific user communities (like a Securities context...)
then it may be appropriate to specify more specific requirements, but general legisla-
tion ... should never distort the competitive and open market for electronic signa-
ture and records technologies."); see also H.R. REP. No. 106-341, pt. 1, at 5 (1999),
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cp06/cpl06query.html (last visited Apr. 26,
2001) ("The legislation is narrowly drawn so as to remove barriers to the use and
acceptance of electronic signatures ... without establishing a regulatory framework
that would hinder the growth of electronic commerce.").
65 See 15 U.S.C.S. § 7003 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2001).
66 Fuller, supra note 23, at 800 (describing the cautionary function as a "check
against inconsiderate action"); see infra notes 107-17 and accompanying text.
67 Fuller, supra note 23, at 800.
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events.6s Interestingly, the legislative history of the Act offers very lit-
tie insight into why these exceptions were created. 9
The exceptions, however, may not last forever. According to E-
Sign, the Secretary of Commerce "shall review the operation of the
exceptions in subsections (a) and (b) to evaluate, over a period of 3
years, whether such exceptions continue to be necessary for the pro-
tection of consumers." 70 Only time will tell how this provision of the
Act will impact electronic transactions and the operation of the excep-
tions. However, the fact that the legislators contemplated a gradual
phase-out of these exceptions suggests they believed that the caution-
ary gap created by E-Sign is only a temporary problem. This may be
an overly optimistic view. 7' Perhaps Congress was not thinking of
Fuller's cautionary function but rather created the exceptions upon
recognizing the difficulty of crafting a signature scheme that would
work for all types of transactions. However, with only some slight
modifications (notarization and attestation, for example), ink-and-
pen signatures do work for all transactions. Inasmuch as an electronic
signature regime falls short of this, it represents an incomplete transi-
tion to the digital age.
Some of the questions or potential problems raised by E-Sign
grow out of more than the fact that the Act is new and untested.
Rather, because E-Sign was designed to be minimalist, non-regulatory,
and "bottom-up,"72 it was meant to be a law without any rules. And
under that standard, E-Sign is a success. It does not presume to tell
people what to do. Accordingly, one attempting to describe the law
and practice of electronic signatures can do little more than quote the
provisions of the Act. But E-Sign is not the only approach; some states
view electronic signature law as an area fit for traditional, prescriptive,
regulatory rules.
B. An Alternative Approach to Electronic Signature Law
If E-Sign represents the minimalist, bottom-up philosophy of elec-
tronic signature law, then the Utah Digital Signature Act is a good,
68 Inadequate preservation of the cautionary function is E-Sign's primary flaw.
This will be explored in more detail at infra notes 140-62 and accompanying text.
69 See H.R. REP. No. 106-341, pt. 1, at 13-19 (1999), available at http://thomas.
loc.gov/cp106/cplO6query.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2001) ("Section-by-Section Anal-
y is of the Legislation"); id. at 15 (offering no analysis of Section 103 other than a
recitation of the exceptions).
70 15 U.S.C.S. § 7003(c).
71 See generally infra notes 107-17 and accompan)ing text.
72 See supra note 12.
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old-fashioned regulatory law.73 The Utah Act will serve as the prime
example of a legal approach to electronic signatures that contrasts
with E-Sign. Utah is a good example because it acted first in this de-
veloping area of the law74 and because the Utah Act represents the
approach to electronic signatures that Congress rejected in passing E-
Sign. This legal regime could be called the "ABA Approach."7 A
clear difference between the Utah Act and E-Sign can be immediately
observed-while the federal law is entitled "Electronic Signatures in
Global and National Commerce Act," the Utah statute is a "Digital Sig-
nature Act." The choice between these two adjectives is a significant
one, and out of the simple selection of a modifying term arises two
completely different legal frameworks.
The federal definition of electronic signature has been discussed
previously. Under that broad standard, something as simple as a
typed name at the bottom of an e-mail message, as well as the more
complicated "digital signature" would be legally sufficient. 76 The
73 See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-101 to 46-3-602 (1998 & Supp. 2000).
74 See id. § 46-3-101, notes (explaining that the Act "became effective on May 1,
1995"); see also R.Jason Richards, The Utah Digital Signature Act as "Model" Legislation: A
Critical Analysis, 17J. MARSHALLJ. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 873, 875 (1999) ("The first
state to address the matter was Utah, which resulted in the adoption of the Utah
Digital Signature Act in 1995.").
75 The ABA Approach, the opposite of the Uniform Law Approach, is also named
for its originator. See Digital Signature Guidelines, supra note 11, available at http://
wv.abanet.org/scitech/home.html, cited in Edward D. Kania, The ABA 's Digital Signa
ture Guidelines: An Imperfect Solution to Digital Signatures on the Internet, 7 ComnLxw CON-
spEcrus 297, 302-04, nn.53-82 (1999) (describing the Guidelines' proposed
asymmetric cryptography system). Asymmetric cryptography is the technology behind
a digital signature, which is discussed at infra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
The Utah Act is also a good example of the ABA Approach because before E-Sign,
one commentator noted that "the common thread that runs through (state electronic
signature laws] is that they replicate, or at least mimic, Utah's approach." Richards,
supra note 74, at 875.
76 Consider the following:
Dear Sirs,
My company has agreed to purchase two thousand widgets from your com-
pany at the price of fifteen dollars ($15.00) per unit. You may ship the
goods to my attention at 123 Main Street, Anytown, USA as soon as possible.
Please include an invoice and your billing address with the shipment. As-
suming the widgets are satisfactory, you will receive a check for payment in
full by the first of the month.
Sincerely yours,
Jane Doe
An e-mail containing this message would be electronically signed under the defi-
nition from E-Sign. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 7006(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2001). This mes-
sage alone probably does not give rise to a binding contract (there is no promise on
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phrase "digital signature," by contrast, has a very precise meaning-
"'Digital signatures' are a subset of electronic signatures that... use
encryption technology to create a secure form of the electronic signa-
ture."77 The Utah Act codifies, in some detail, the digital signature
process.78 That process requires two "keys," a public key and a private
key.79 The "keys" are computer-generated, mathematical algorithms
that are unique to the individual using them. The digital signer uses
her private key (an algorithm to which only she has access) to encrypt
the message.80 Once encrypted, the signer sends her message to the
intended recipient, who must access the public key in order to decode
the message. 8' A neutral third party, usually referred to as the "certifi-
cation authority," maintains the public keys.82 The recipient obtains
the public key from the certification authority and uses it to decode
the message.8 3 This process ensures the validity of both the sender
the part of the shipping company), but if this message amounted to the acceptance of
an e-mailed offer, we would have not only a binding contract, but an electronically
signed one as well. See also William A. Tanenbaum, Paperless Contracts Are Here, N.Y.
LJ., Apr. 24, 2000, at S4, SlO (describing electronic signature as "a lowest common
denominator term .... An example is a typed name such as 'Is/John Doe'...
77 Tanenbaum, supra note 76, at S10.
78 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-401(1) (1998) ("W here a rule of law requires
a signature, or provides for certain consequences in the absence of a signature, that
rule is satisfied by a digital signature if- (a) that digital signature is verified by refer-
ence to the public key... (b) that digital signature ims affixed by the signer ...."); see
also id. §§ 46-3-301 to 46-3-310 (oudining the "Duties of Certification Authority and
Subscriber").
79 See Kania, supra note 75, at 300-01.
80 Id. at 300.
81 Id.
82 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-103(4); Kania, supra note 75, at 300.
83 Contrary to the electronically signed example at supra note 76, a diitally signed
message might look like the following, taken from John C. Anderson & Michael L
Closen, Document Authentication in Electronic Conmerce: The AlislkadingNotar Public Ana-
logfor the Digital Signature Certifcation Authori y, 17J. uA.sHArLLJ. Cou'Trrva & INFO. L
833, 851 n.110 (1999) (citations omitted):
- BEGIN SIGNED MESSAGE -
Name: Chicago Widget Corp.
Order No: 2523
Date: June 2, 1999
This document is an order for 500 blue idgets at the price of $100 /each.
- END SIGNED MESSAGE -
Public ID# 7Y4737Y34874
Public key available at:
http://wv.certification authority.com/ciicagoidget/publickey.html
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and the document in that "if the message was originally forged (a pri-
vate key which does not correspond to the public key was used to sign
the message), the public key will not properly interact .... ,,114 Fur-
thermore, "if one alters the message prior to its receipt, then it will
alter the hash result and one cannot recreate the original message
from the public key."85 The use of a neutral third party adds a height-
ened degree of legalism to the whole affair, much like having a paper
document notarized.
86
While a digital signature satisfies E-Sign's definition of "electronic
signature," so do many other things. The primary difference between
the "minimalist," "technology-neutral" approach of E-Sign and the op-
posite tack embodied in the Utah Act is the degree of required techno-
logical security. E-Sign allows the contracting parties to determine for
themselves how to electronically sign a document while the Utah Act
imagines that electronically signed documents must live up to the rig-
orous standards of the digital signature. More specifically, the Utah
Act provides, "A message is as valid, enforceable, and effective as if it
had been written on paper, if it: (a) bears in its entirety a digital signa-
ture; and (b) that digital signature is verified by the public key .... -17
The Utah Act, unlike E-Sign, does not provide for any excepted trans-
actions. Additionally, the Utah Act provides that "nothing in this
chapter precludes any symbol from being valid as a signature under
other applicable law,"88 and it "does not limit the authority of the
State Tax Commission to prescribe the form of tax returns or other
documents filed with the State Tax Commission."8 9 With these provi-
sions, Utah allows for some flexibility in its rules that are, by design,
very demanding. These demanding rules, however, are not without
benefits: with greater particularity in signature creation comes greater
certainty in the results. Contrary to the vague "may not be denied
- END SIGNATURE -
84 Kania, supra note 75, at 301.
85 Id. The basic technology behind a digital signature is cryptography, the math-
ematical process of scrambling and unscrambling information. In the case of a digital
signature, the scrambling and unscrambling is achieved through the pair of "keys"
described above. For a more detailed discussion of this technology, see Anderson &
Closen, supra note 83, at 850-53, and citations therein. See also Kania, supra note 75,
at 300-02.
86 See generally Anderson & Closen, supra note 83 (referring to the certification
authority as a "cybernotary" and arguing that the position must be one of respect and
professionalism).
87 UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-403 (1998). Note that "message" is defined under the
Utah Act as "a digital representation of information." Id. § 46-3-103(18).
88 Id. § 46-3-401(2).
89 Id. § 46-3-402(3).
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legal effect... solely because it is in electronic form,"90 a properly
executed digital signature in Utah is "as valid... as if it had been
written on paper."9'
Utah's provision allowing for the use of "other applicable law" is
interesting because in May 2000, Utah adopted a version of the
UETA.92 Thus, while this discussion focuses on Utah as an example of
the ABA Approach, in contrast to the E-Sign and the Uniform Law
Approach, in truth, the separation is not so neat. By enacting a Uni-
form Law-styled electronic signature law to work in conjunction with its
digital signature law, the state of Utah does not mandatorily require
the more rigorous provisions of the digital signature (or so it would
seem). Utah's recent action may demonstrate that one commentator
was correct: "Despite a brief fad in the mid-1990s favoring a regula-
tory, technology-specific approach to electronic commerce, the vast
majority of state governments have recently opted for a minimalist,
non-regulatory and technology-neutral stance."93 However, the most
popular trend in law does not necessarily equate with what is best.
9 4
C. Electronic Signatures Versus Digital Signatures:
The Benefits and Burdens
Some of the attractive points of the competing electronic signa-
ture philosophies surfaced in the discussion above, but it would be
wise to briefly explore the benefits of each, particularly with respect to
90 15 U.S.G.S. § 7001(a) (1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2001) (emphasis added). The
implication is that other, unspecified reasons may be sufficient to "den[y] legal ef-
fect." Id.
91 UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-403.
92 See id. §§ 464-101 to 46-4-501 (Supp. 2000).
93 The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act: Hearings on H.R.
1714 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protecion of the
House Commerce Comm., 106th Cong. 28 (1999) (statement of Daniel Greenwood, Dep-
uty General Counsel of Information Technology Division, Commonwealth of
Massachusetts).
94 The full implications of Utah's action remain to be seen. It is premature, how-
ever, to view the Utah version of the UETA as a denunciation of its digital signature
philosophy. Both laws remain on the books. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-101 to 46-3-
602 (1998); id. §§ 46-4-101 to 46-4-501 (Supp. 2000). Allowing the two regimes to
work in tandem will likely provide a more nuanced electronic signature law. Transact-
ing parties can obtain true certainty by utilizing a digital signature, thereby making
the contract "as valid... as if it had been written on paper," id. § 46-3-403, or they can
opt for a less technologically secure standard, knowing that the electronic form will be
insufficient to "den[y] legal effect," it. § 46-4-201(1). This coordination of legal
schemes appears to be Utah's intent. See it. § 46-4-106 ("This chapter must be con-
strued and applied: (1) to facilitate electronic transactions consistent with other appli-
cable law.").
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formalities. The primary benefit of the Uniform Law approach (be-
yond legal vogue) is flexibility: laws such as E-Sign allow contracting
parties to choose for themselves what constitutes a satisfactory "signa-
ture" while also allowing the technology of electronic signing to evolve
without the requirement of a new law. The problem with such expan-
sive flexibility is that virtually everything amounts to a valid electronic
signature. Contracting parties cannot submit a typed 'Jane Doe" to
handwriting analysis, and oftentimes, neither will they be able to lo-
cate a witness to the "signing.
'9 5
The ABA Approach, on the other hand, may be too inflexible for
many. Whereas E-Sign and similar laws allow contracting parties to
practice as much or as little technological security as they like, laws
such as the Utah Digital Signature Act set up a mandatory set of stan-
dards that every "sound, symbol, or process" must meet in order to
rise to the level of a legal signature. Not only does this shoehorn
transactors into technology they may not be able to afford, but it also
leaves little room for substantial technological innovation over the
years.96 The ABA Approach presents other problems that are well-
documented by R. Jason Richards. 97 For example, the Utah Act ex-
plicitly reverses certain evidentiary presumptions: "the general rule
when challenging the authenticity of a signature is that the signature
is presumed invalid, but is subject to being rebutted .... However,
the Utah Act obviates this traditional standard by clothing a verifiable
digital signature with a presumption of validity that the challenger
must counter."98 This concern, along with questions about the Act's
95 This is why the law of evidence views e-mails with some degree of skepticism,
SeeJOHN W. STRONG ET AL., McCoR-MIc ON EVIDENCE § 225 (5th ed. 1999) [hereinaf-
ter McCoRNucK] ("[E]-mail can be viewed as roughly analogous to an unsigned letter
written on letterhead stationery. In both instances, the indication of the source of the
communication is susceptible to misappropriation and unauthorized use, and, ac-
cordingly, some further evidence of authenticity should arguably be required.").
96 Certainly digital signature technology might improve, but totally new tech-
niques for "signing" electronic documents would probably require either a new law or
substantial amendment of existing law.
97 See generally Richards, supra note 74 (criticizing the Utah Act's status as "model
legislation").
98 I& at 905 (citations omitted); cf UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-406.
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allocation of liability,99 was echoed in the Congressional hearings on
E-Sign. 00
The problems that Richards and others °1 point out need to be
taken seriously, but they center on aspects of the legal regime beyond
the signatures themselves. For present purposes-assessing the com-
peting signature philosophies as legal formalities-those questions
can be set aside. Furthermore, there is a positive side to laws like the
Utah Act; the ABA Approach gives a heightened degree of security
and trustworthiness to electronic transactions.
0 2
On the whole, one shouldn't over-emphasize the kinds of differ-
ences discussed above because contract law is secondary to the act of
contracting. That is, contracting parties can choose for themselves
whether to prioritize issues of security or of flexibility or legal certainty
or whether to use an electronic signature, or even whether to sign an
agreement at all; the legal system only gets involved when there is a
dispute. 03 At that level, though, the ABA and Uniform Law Ap-
proaches represent two very different ways of resolving contract dis-
putes. These legal regimes also take divergent views of how to best
"computerize" the traditional legal formality of a signature. Drawing
upon Lon Fuller's explanation of the importance of legal form, I now
turn to an examination of the competing philosophies.
99 See Richards, supra note 74, at 902 (noting the Utah Act's limit on recovery due
to certification authority negligence to direct compensatory damages (not punitive
damages, lost profits, or pain and suffering) and commenting that "[ljimiting liability
in such a manner is ill-advised").
100 See The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act: Hearings on H..
1714 Before the Subcomm. on Telecominunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the
House Commerce Comm., 106th Cong. 19, 29 (1999) (statement of Daniel Greenwood,
Deputy General Counsel of Information Technology Division, Commonwealth of
Massachusetts) (arguing that a digital signature lav "should not tamper with rules of
evidence and liability apportionment as an industrial policy setting mechanism").
101 See, e.g., Kania, supra note 75, at 310 (reviewing the ABA Guidelines reliance
factors and their codification in the Utah Act and concluding that they represent "an
improper attempt to re-allocate risk for these commercial transactions").
102 Even though Edward Kania raises some criticisms against the ABA Approach,
he must also admit that "[t]he 'digital signature' s)stem accomplishes the nece-sary
authentication requirements for a legally-binding signature." Id. at 301.
103 SeeKNAPP Er At_, supra note 19, at 17 ("[T]he vast majority of disputes that the
rules of contract law could solve are never submitted to a court for derision.").
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III. ELEcTRONIc SIGNATURES AS LEGAL FORMALITIES
A. Fuller's Concept of Legal Formalities
In 1941, the Columbia Law Review prepared an entire issue on the
usefulness of the consideration doctrine in contract law. 114 Each of
the contributors explored the history and value of the consideration
doctrine, assessing whether American contract law should abandon
consideration as a requirement for enforceable contracts.', For
some, this question could turn on whether consideration is a "substan-
tive" provision of contract law or whether it is 'just a formality."10"
Taking up this strain of the argument, Lon Fuller explained that con-
sideration has both formal and substantive aspects. 10 7 Unlike many,
however, he did not believe that only its substantive aspects recom-
mend the doctrine of consideration. Rather, concluding that Ameri-
can law ought not to abandon the doctrine,10 Fuller explained how
the "merely" formal aspects of law serve great value. 10 9
According to Fuller, legal formalities serve three important func-
tions-the evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling functions.I"' As to
the evidentiary function, Fuller explains, "The most obvious function
of a legal formality is, to use Austin's words, that of providing 'evi-
dence of the existence and purport of the contact, in case of contro-
versy.""" In addition to evidence, formalities fulfill a cautionary
104 See 41 COLUM. L. REV. 777 (1941).
105 See K.N. Llewellyn, On the Complexity of Consideration: A Foreword, 41 COLUM. L.
Rxv. 777, 779-82 (1941) (introducing the articles to follow and emphasizing the im-
portance of studying the consideration doctrine). Llewellyn noted that "we are faced
with a body of doctrine about day to day transactions which originated in Elizabeth's
time .... Surely such a body of doctrine vitally needs such critical restudy." Id. at
782.
106 See Fuller, supra note 23, at 799 (explaining that "a significant relationship
between consideration and form is a proposition not here suggested for the first time;
indeed the question has been raised (and sometimes answered affirmatively) whether
consideration cannot in the end be reduced entirely to terms of form").
107 Id.
108 Id. at 824.
109 See id. at 800-06.
110 Id. at 800-01. For a more recent conclusion that formalities serve at least seven
functions (many of which could be placed under Fuller's three), see Eric Mills
Holmes, Stature and Status of a Promise Under Seal as a Legal Formality, 29 WILL-AMETrE L.
Rv. 617, 626 (1993) (arguing that formalities serve the following functions: "ceremo-
nial, evidentiary, security, cautionary, deterrent, channeling or earmarking, clarifica-
tion and certainty, and economic efficiency").
111 Fuller, supra note 23, at 800 (quoting John Austin, Fragments-On Contracts, in
2 LECruREs ONJURISPRUDENCE 939-44 (London, J. Murray, 4th ed. 1879)).
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function;112 they give a sense of importance to the transaction and
cause the transactor to take pause before entering into a legal obliga-
tion. The most traditional of formalities, the seal, best performed this
function: "The affixing and impressing of a wax wafer-symbol in the
popular mind of legalism and weightiness-wras an excellent device
for inducing the circumspective frame of mind appropriate in one
pledging his future."" 3 Finally, in what Fuller believes to be an often-
ignored function, formalities serve a channeling role-they quickly
and easily distinguish the legal from the non-legal.'
14
In expanding upon these aspects of legal form, Fuller explores
how the three often interrelate with one another," 5 but he also em-
phasizes the importance of understanding the differences, because, in
his view, deciding "borderline cases of compliance may turn on our
assumptions as to the end primarily sought by a particular formal-
ity.""16 Finally, before turning to the substantive aspects of the doc-
trine of consideration, Fuller briefly discusses when legal formalities
are needed. He explains, "The need for investing a particular transac-
tion with some legal formality will depend upon the extent to which
the guaranties that the formality would afford are rendered superflu-
ous by forces native to the situation out of which the transaction
arises . "117
B. Other Views and Theories on Legal Formalities
Fuller offered perhaps the most succinct and clear exposition of
the importance and usefulness of legal form of anyone before or
since. In exploring the formality of the electronic signature, this Note
112 Id. at 800.
113 Id.; see also Holmes, supra note 110, at 622 (describing usage of the seal as ",an
awesome, special formality-a mystical solemnity of the ceremonial melting of hot
wax, a signet ring that personified the promisor, and a writing the reified legal
obligation").
114 Fuller, supra note 23, at 801; see also Posner, stupra note 24, at 419-20 (arguing,
on economic grounds, that the formality of the seal advances courts' interests in
efficiency).
115 Fuller, supra note 23, at 803-04.
116 Id. at 804. This can be clearly seen in the case of the Statute of Frauds. If one
believes that the formal requirement of having some contracts in writing serves
merely evidentiary functions, then she is likely to enforce the agreement in the teeth
of the Statute if other evidence indicates an intent to be bound. However, if the
Statute also realizes cautionary or channeling goals, then a court may have reason to
deny enforcement to an agreement that does not comply with the Statute even if the
parties clearly intended an obligation. Cf. id. (discussing the same concept vdtli re-
spect to the parol evidence rule).
117 Id. at 805 (emphasis omitted).
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draws primarily from Professor Fuller. However, he is by no means
the only scholar to comment on the subject. To fully appreciate legal
formalities, a few other concepts deserve mention.
1. Definition of Formality
Fuller's discussion of formality assumes a working understanding
of the topic.1 8 Duncan Kennedy, however, tries to formulate a defini-
tion. He explains, "Formality consists in the attempt to accomplish
substantively rational results... through substantively rational formu-
lation and mechanical application of rules rather than directly
through substantively rational decision processes." 119 More simply,
this means that formalities are mechanical, that is non-substantive,
rules designed to substitute for the difficult task of determining
whether the substantive requirements of a given transaction were ful-
filled. In terms of a contract law example, this means that formalities
save judges the task of exploring whether or not two contracting par-
ties intended to be bound. Rather, ajudge simply looks to a formality
(for example, a signature, a written contract, or a document under
seal) and mechanically ascertains intent.
2. Formalities in the Law of Wills
Like sealed documents, 120 the process of creating a valid will in-
volves a heightened degree of formality. 121 This fact has inspired a
great deal of commentary on formalism in the wills context, 22 and
the crossroads of Fuller's and Kennedy's thoughts on formality can be
found in Professor Bruce Mann's examination of the most prominent
formality in the law of wills: attestation. 123 Having witnesses attest to a
will certainly serves the evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling func-
118 See id. at 799 ("What is attempted in this article is an inquiry into the rationale
of legal formalities."). With this opening phrase, Fuller is off on an extended disctis-
sion of formality.
119 Kennedy, Legal Formality, supra note 24, at 358.
120 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
121 SeeJames Lindgren, The Fall of Formalism, 55 ALB. L. REv. 1009, 1009 (1992)
("The fear that [people] might improvidently give away their property at death has
left a legacy of formalism unmatched in American law.").
122 See generallyJohn H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HAV.
L. REv. 489 (1975); Lindgren, supra note 121; Bruce H. Mann, Formalities and Formal-
ism in the Uniform Probate Code, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1994); C. Douglas Miller, Will
Formality, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative Reform: An Examination of the Nea Unffon
Probate Code "Harmless Error" Rule and the Movement Toward Amnorphism, 43 FLA. L. REV.
167 (1991) (part 1); id., 43 FLA. L. REv. 599 (1991) (part 2).
123 See Mann, supra note 122, at 1041-43.
[VOL- 76:4120 4
NOTE: THE E-SIGN ACT OF 2000
tions: witnesses give clear evidence that a will -as in fact signed, they
provide an aura of caution and ceremony to the ivill-signing process,
and they quickly and clearly distinguish legal from non-legal wvills.12 4
However, attestation fares poorly as Kennedy's "rational realization of
substantive determinations." While this formality provides a quick
and easy demarcation between valid and invalid wills, it may, and
often does, exclude documents that bear all of the substantive aspects
of a will.' 25 This is particularly true when a will is attested to but the
attestation is legally flawed in some respect. Professor Mann writes, "It
is thus depressingly common to see courts... rejecting elaborate wills
drafted by attorneys and signed in formal execution ceremonies
where the testator or witnesses happened to sign in the wrong place or
in the wrong order."' 26 For this reason, Mann and others applaud the
diminished importance of formalities under the 1990 Uniform Pro-
bate Code.
127
If the underlying determination can be made without the form-
as in the case of testamentary intent-then the formality begins to act
like a handicap, especially if it is strictly and mandatorily applied.
-'28
However, in the contracts realm, formalities are not almays
mandatory.12 9 Thus, contract formalities often are not "rules" as in
the Kennedy definition, and even those that rise to the rule-level, for
example the Statute of Frauds, are riddled with exceptions.'" For
these reasons, contract formalities need not carry the stigma ofjudges
mechanically applying centuries-old rules that merely frustrate the ob-
vious intentions of the parties, and an electronic signature law conse-
124 See generally id. (discussing the role of attestation in the law of ills).
125 See id. at 1042.
126 Id. (citations omitted).
127 See, e.g., Lindgren, supra note 121, at 1024-30 (calling for the complete aban-
donment of the attestation requirement). &egenerally Langbein, supra note 122 (call-
ing for a standard of "substantial compliance" in judging a uill's compliance ith
legal formalities). Langbein's work is considered to be the impetus behind the 1990
revisions of the Uniform Probate Code. See Mann, supra note 122, at 1033.
128 This realization may have influenced the "minimalist" and "technology-neu-
tral" impetus behind E-Sign. See supra notes 12, 64, and accompanying text. Indeed,
"minimalist" in contract legislation may simply be one way of saying "anti.formalist."
129 See, e.g., Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256, 259 (N.Y. 1891); supra text accompany-
ing note 20 (discussing enforceability of contracts in the absence of a written docu-
ment). By most accounts, the formality of consideration is mandatory, and this fact
inspired the works in the May 1941 issue of the Columbia Law Review.
130 See, e.g., REsrATENMENT (SEcOND) OF CoNTrrs § 129 (1981) ("A contract for
the transfer of an interest in land may be specifically enforced ntuitlitandingfailre to
comply with the Statute of Frauds."(emphasis added)); id. § 139(1) ("A promise... is
enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement. .. ").
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quently need -not be anti-formalist. Rather, contract formalities
generally serve the functions recognized by Lon Fuller. Indeed, the
formality of a written document has attained such prominent use not
because the law requires it, but because businesspeople impose the
requirement on themselves.
3. Formalities and E-Sign
In describing the interrelationship of formal functions, Fuller ex-
plained: "Generally speaking, whatever tends to accomplish one of
these purposes will also tend to accomplish the other two. He who is
compelled to do something which will furnish a satisfactory memorial
of his intention will be induced to deliberate."13 1 In the twenty-first
century, this is no longer true. Computers are notoriously effective in
providing memorials of what transpires, 13 2 but the click of a mouse is
extremely casual and non-deliberative. Thus, because electronic
transactions differ in this important respect-the cautionary func-
tion-legislation creating a computerized legal formality must take af-
firmative steps to preserve formal functions that thrived naturally in
the ink-and-pen world.
C. Contracts Under E-Sign: What Would Professor Fuller Say?
The discussion to this point has focused on the theoretical differ-
ences between a digital signature and an electronic signature, along
with a brief discussion of legal formality. In the remaining
paragraphs, we will see how the theoretical grounds of legal formali-
ties point to the superiority of the ABA Approach.
The first of Fuller's functions is evidence. The evidentiary superi-
ority of the ABA Approach has been addressed previously, 133 and it
hardly comes as a surprise. An encrypted computer message verified
by a neutral third party goes much further in establishing "evidence of
the existence and purport of the contract ' 134 than does a typed e-mail,
131 Fuller, supra note 23, at 803.
132 Increasingly, law enforcement agencies rely on the "memorials" contained in-
side a computer to track or prosecute suspects. See, e.g., David Johnston & Marc
Lacey, Justice Officials Begin an Inquiry into White House, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2000, at Al
(reporting that "all incoming [White House] e-mail messages were now recorded in a
form that made them searchable"); Matt Richtel, Canada Arrests 15-Year-Old in Welb
Attack, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 20, 2000, at Cl (describing how the F.B.I. utilized a "crucial
piece of evidence"-a suspicious computer from the University of California at Santa
Barbara-in order to trace the attacker to Canada).
133 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
134 Fuller, supra note 23, at 800 (quotingJohn Austin, Fragments-On Contracts, in
2 LECUREs ON JURISPRUDENCE 939-44 (London, J. Murray, 4th ed, 1879).
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which is "roughly analogous to an unsigned letter written on letter-
head stationery." 3 5 However, this evidentiary superiority comes at the
expense of legal flexibility and may require expensive investments in
computer technology. Thus, the superiority of the ABA Approach in
this realm may not be sufficient to recommend it as a legal
philosophy.
The second of Fuller's functions is channeling. Again, the ABA
Approach is more effective. Formalities often serve to channel certain
disputes into the legal system and leave others out 1 36 Under E-Sign's
overly broad definition of electronic signature and equally genera-
lized language concerning legal validity, nearly every electronic trans-
action can become a legally cognizable contract. The courts may not
be ready for the workload this could create, and a legal regime along
Utah's model would more dearly distinguish the legal from the non-
legal.' 3 7 Nevertheless, formalities acting solely as an earmark of legal-
ity, or a Kennedy-style legal shorthand, fall victim to many of the criti-
cisms launched by scholars in the law of wills.138 Indeed, contract law
has moved steadily away from this kind of formality through such
movements as the abolition of the seal and the establishment of the
Uniform Commercial Code.'3 9 Under this analysis, E-Sign's lack of
formalism could be viewed as an element of progress. Thus, again,
the superiority of the ABA Approach does not de-legitimize E-Sign.
Yet, one function remains.
The last of Fuller's functions is caution. Here, the ABA Approach
is most dominant, and E-Sign is most wanting. Consider, for example,
the Reali'etworks case.' 40 Although it did not arise under E-Sign, the
"signature" at issue would more than likely satisfy the Act's definition
of an electronic signature.' 4' But the losing parties probably believed,
quite sensibly, that they were not dealing with a legal signature.
135 McCoRMIcK, supra note 95, § 225.
136 See supra note 113 and accompanying text; see also Posner, supra note 24, at 420
(discussing the value of the seal (a formality) as a simple way of ensuring legal
enforceability).
137 See supra text accompanying note 91 (citing UT,, H CODE ANN. § 46-3-403
(1998)) (noting the certainty of legal status under Utah's Digital Signature Act).
138 See supra notes 120-30 and accompanying text.
139 See Scm ARTz & ScoTr, supra note 7, at 48 (arguing that the U.C.C. "deem-
phasizes formalities and directs attention to 'the true understanding of the parties as
to the agreement'").
140 SeeIn reRealNetworks, Inc., Privacy Litig., No. OOC 1366, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6584 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2000); see also supra notes 37-48 and accompamying text.
141 See In re RealNetworks, Inc., Privacy Litig., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6584, at 011
(holding that the electronic agreement amounted to a %riting" and noting the then-
current Congressional discussions over E-Sign).
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RealNetworks involved a familiar set of facts to anyone who has ever
downloaded or installed computer software: before installation can be
completed, a verbose "Agreement" appears on the screen, and the
user is compelled to click "I Agree" if she wishes to use the software.
The act of clicking one's mouse on the "I Agree" button probably
amounts to a "signing" of the agreement under E-Sign.
1,12 Yet, it is
likely that few of the plaintiffs imagined they were entering into a
binding legal contract that would significantly affect their rights.
14'4
Digital signatures, by contrast, evoke a much greater degree of cau-
tion because they require both the use of a special "key" that the
sender must keep secret and the registration of one's public key with
an important official.144 If during the process of downloading
software one is required to utilize her public key to "sign" an agree-
ment with the software maker, this will trigger a notion of legalism
inherent in the signing event. Further, the very decision to invest in
key-pair encryption technology is a costly one that will likely remind
the user of the legal seriousness involved in using that technology.
Other cases in the electronic signature realm emphasize that a
casual definition of electronic signature, such as the one utilized by E-
142 Clicking the "I Agree" button is very clearly "an electronic... process, attached
to or logically associated with a contract or other record." 15 U.S.C.S. § 7006(5)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 2001). However, the act of clicking may or may not be "executed
or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record." Id. This is true because
intent is unique to each individual and each transaction. Furthermore, the verb "to
sign" is not defined in E-Sign. Thus, it is unclear what kind of intent a person must
have. However, a literal understanding of intention has a very small role to play in
modem contract litigation. For example, in RealNetworks, it is extremely unlikely that
plaintiff class members truly intended to sign away their rights to a judicial forum,
However, the enforceability of the arbitration clause turned on more technical con-
siderations; the court was uninterested in what plaintiffs intended. It is likely that the
same would be true of documents "signed" under E-Sign.
143 Here, plaintiffs were held to have "agreed" to submit all of their disputes to
arbitration. See In re RealNetworks, Inc., Privacy Litig., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6584, at
*21. In effect, they "signed away" their rights to ajudicial forum without having ever
signed anything. My critique is directed to this phenomenon-the casual signature.
One might criticize the way that courts find "agreement" in standard adhesion con-
tracts regardless of how such "agreements" are signed. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines,
Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 585, 596-97 (1991) (upholding a forum selection "agree-
ment" found in the small print on the back of a cruise ticket). This Note, however,
expresses no opinion on that topic.
144 See generally supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text. As to how the Certifica-
tion Authority lends a sense of legalism to a digitally signed transaction, see Anderson
& Closen, supra note 83, at 839-40 (comparing the certification authority to a notary
public and arguing "that lawmakers more carefully guard the office of certification
authority to ensure it is held as a position of respect to help assure cybernotarized
documents will be accepted both domestically and internationally").
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Sign, presents problems. In Caronna v. Sween, ' the New York Un-
employment Insurance Appeal Board denied plaintiff's unemploy-
ment benefits. 146 The State had permitted Caronna to certify his
continuing eligibility for unemployment by means of a telephone
call. 147 Caronna received "a confidential personal identification num-
ber [PIN] to serve as his electronic signature."" 8 Because plaintiff
violated the rules of the telephone registration and allowed his wife to
use the PIN, the State revoked his eligibility for unemployment, and
the Appellate Division affirmed its decision. 149 If Mr. Caronna consid-
ered his personal identification number to be a signature, he might
have thought twice about allowing his wife to use it, because her use of
a true signature belonging to someone else might be considered a
kind of forgery. 5 0 Again, the use of a more complex and "legalistic"
process, such as a digital signature, would have alerted Caronna to the
seriousness of the transaction.
Outside of the limited case law, one can imagine a variety of
other technologies that might also satisfy E-Sign's simple require-
ments. Shortly after President Clinton's "e-signing" of the Act, Bar-
naby J. Feder, of The New York Times, speculated on new electronic
signature techniques that might become popular under the law.' 5 '
Feder discusses a company called Signature-mail.com and its tech-
nique for attaching a picture of one's actual signature to an e-mail
message, but adds, "The company's founders figure such a device may
well be unacceptable as a legal e-signature since anyone could hit the
computer key to send it and hackers might easily forge it."152 Feder
and his sources at Signature-mail.com seem to have confused "legal"
with "reliable." They have legitimate concerns over the e-mailed pic-
ture of a signature. Such a device, because of the opportunity for for-
geries and unauthorized users, fails to convey either "signer
145 660 N.Y.S.2d 171 (App. Div. 1997).




150 See United States v. Miller, 70 F.3d 1353, 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (upholding a
forgery conviction on a finding that the defendant's use of the %ictim's "PIN, which
acts as a sort of electronic signature authorizing an ATM to release available funds...
is tantamount to cashing a check with a forged signature").
151 See Feder, supra note 17, at C1.
152 I&
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authentication" or "document authentication,"' 3  but it would satisfy
E-Sign's minimal standards.
15 4
What all of these examples point to is the fact that electronic sig-
nature technology, in all of its forms, "looks nothing like a scrawled
John Hancock"' 55 or any other traditional legal formality. Contrary to
"an awesome, special formality-a mystical solemnity of the ceremo-
nial melting of hot wax, a signet ring that personified the promisor,
and a writing the reified legal obligation," 156 we are now faced with a
gray "I Agree" button hovering under the mouse pointer, a faceless
telephone system into which the caller punches a string of numbers,
or a "click here to attach signature" icon. Even the third, which is
admittedly less common than the first two, is a casual, seemingly insig-
nificant event. There is nothing mystical, reifying, or even (to the
careless observer) legal about any of these. A more responsive ap-
proach to electronic signature law would recognize the apparent lack
of legality in many electronic transactions and attach legal signifi-
cance to events that follow a popular perception of significance. How-
ever, E-Sign does not allow for such leeway. It explains that
ccelectronic form," in all of its many varieties, is no reason to "den [y]
legal effect.'
57
Lon Fuller's largely theoretical discussion of formality recognized
the importance of this commonsense aspect to the law. He explained,
"The need for investing a particular transaction with some legal for-
mality will depend upon the extent to which the guaranties that the
formality would afford are rendered superfluous by forces native to
the situation out of which the transaction arises."158 In a more recent
analysis of "a federal digital signature law and ... the structure that
such a law should take,"'159 Edward D. Kania explores the forces native
to the situation of electronic commerce.' 60 Kania argues that those
forces alone are not sufficient: simply affixing a casually-defined "sig-
nature" at the end of a document will not suffice because "the signa-
ture will possess no unique characteristic that will ensure the identity
153 See Kania, supra note 75, at 299 (explaining that a signature "denote[s] who
has signed the written document. . . [and] identiffies] the data the signatory ac-
cepted so one may not alter the data after the signature has occurred").
154 See 15 U.S.C.S. § 7006(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2001) (defining "electronic
signature").
155 Feder, supra note 17, at C1.
156 Holmes, supra note 110, at 622.
157 15 U.S.G.S. § 7001 (a) (1).
158 Fuller, supra note 23, at 805.
159 Kania, supra note 75, at 298.
160 See generally id. at 300-02.
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of the signatory."' 6 Drawing upon this, Kania emphasizes that elec-
tronic signatures must meet more rigorous standards. Though his ar-
ticle focuses almost exclusively on security features and technology,
Kania reaches the same conclusions compelled by Fuller's cautionary
function: "The 'digital signature' system [in contrast to a system like E-




A degree of "legal uncertainty" 63 certainly did mar the law of
electronic signatures before the passage of E-Sign. And the common
law, potentially a fruitful source of legal innovation, did not move
quickly or decisively in this area. Perhaps legislation was the correct
move, but Congress faced two major legislative philosophies in provid-
ing for legally-recognized electronic signatures: the digital signature
model and the electronic signature model. Congress rejected the digi-
tal signature approach and, with it, Lon Fuller's cautionary function.
In fact, E-Sign falls far short of a digital signature law, such as Utah's,
in preserving all three of the traditional functions of formality. Yet,
many legal scholars reject formality as a valid consideration for mod-
em law, 16 4 and this attitude has been a strong part of many trends in
the law of contracts.' 65 However, the formality of a signature seems to
be different. Contracting parties make extensive use of it though con-
tract law only requires it for certain types of agreements, 66 and for
this reason, this Note has argued that any variations on a traditional
signature must fulfill the traditional functions of formality.
Those traditional functions-Fuller's cautionary, evidentiary, and
channeling functions-were not the concerns driving Congress to
pass E-Sign. Rather, Congress hoped to encourage electronic transac-
161 Md at 300 (citations omitted).
162 Id. at 301 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Kania's emphasis on ques-
tions of "security" should be understood to involve many of the same concerns as my
discussion of the cautionary function. The importance of Kania's conclusion is that
something less than the digital signature system offers insufficient protection. Indeed,
he offers modifications beyond the legal protections embodied in the ABA Digital
Signature Guidelines. See generally idt at 305-13.
163 H.R REP. No. 106-341, pt. 1, at 7 (1999), available at http://thoms.loc.gov/
cp106/cp106query.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2001).
164 For a sampling of commentators advancing this view, see supra note 122.
165 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
166 See RESTAT ENT (SECOND) OF CONTrAS § 110 (1981) (listing classes of con-
tracts for which enforceability requires "a written memorandum").
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tions.167 The literature calling for electronic signature laws168 has
consistently argued that "the new electronic infrastructure is likely to
transform the face of American commerce" 169 and that "the legal re-
quirements that allowed traditional communications to bind parties
are uncertain when applied to their newer electronic counter-
parts."'70 Congress believed in this and crafted a law that would pro-
vide certainty with minimal standards and specifics. And it will
probably work; E-Sign's less rigorous standards may in fact stimulate
Internet business and electronic transacting. 17 1 The law is also ex-
tremely flexible, allowing "industry to lead"' 72 and technology to
adapt over time. Amazingly, all of these various objectives fit easily
under the Act. And this is what Congress had in mind; E-Sign is an
extremely functional law, but the upshot of this approach is that more
and more people will find themselves "signing" things without realiz-
ing they have entered into legally binding transactions.
It is possible that this analysis is overstated; the clich6 warns us
not to place form over function. From this perspective, the sheer nov-
elty of the Internet and electronic transactions may mean that Lon
Fuller is the wrong source. He wrote in an age before computers, let
alone the Internet. Perhaps his views are inappropriate here, and per-
haps E-Sign represents a progressive adaptation to a new reality rather
than an incautious break with formal traditions. But Professor Fuller
was careful not to limit himself to the realities of his day. He wrote,
"Whether there is any need.., to set up a formality designed to in-
duce deliberation will depend upon the degree to which the factual
situation, innocent of any legal remolding, tends to bring about the
167 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
168 See, e.g., Tupper, supra note 16.
169 Id. at 237 (citations omitted).
170 Id. at 238.
171 See Feder, supra note 17, at Cl ("This new law sends a message to the business
community that e-signatures are O.K." (quoting Kevin M. Coleman, Internet Security
Specialist for KPMG)). If nothing else, a Congressional statement on legal validity
raises public interest (and presumably also public confidence) in electronic
signatures.
172 The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act: Hearings on f.R
1714 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the
House Commerce Comm., 106th Cong. 19, 22 (1999) (statement of Donald W. Upson,
Secretary of Technology, Commonwealth of Virginia) (arguing that Congress should
follow Virginia's approach, which is based on "principles, which reflect the need for
global cooperation spurred by technological and market-driven solutions... : 1. The
private sector should lead").
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desired circumspective frame of mind."173 We have seen that the
modem-day computer world falls far short of this.
17"
Taking Fuller's own words, then, a signature law inside the com-
puter and Internet world must "set up a formality." This is precisely
what the Utah Digital Signature Act does. It provides for a state offi-
cial to maintain and verify an essential element of the digital signa-
ture;175 it specifically lists the requirements of a v-alid digital
signature;176 and it enumerates the consequences of meeting those
requirements. 177 All of this creates a legal environment that injects
caution into the normally casual world of the Internet and alerts trans-
actors to the "legal" (that is, serious) nature of a digitally signed trans-
action. As noted previously, the Utah Act is not flawless,' 78 but it is a
step in the right direction. A federal law based on this model would
go much further in striking the proper balance between function and
form.
173 Fuller, supra note 23, at 805.
174 See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
175 UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-104 (1998); see also id. §§ 46-3-201 to 46-3-310 (outlin-
ing the "Licensing and Regulation of Certification Authorities" and the "Duties of
Certification Authority and Subscriber").
176 Id. § 46-3-401 (1) (requiring that a digital signature be verified by a public key
that is listed in a valid certificate, issued by a certification authority, and affixed by the
signer with intent to sign).
177 Id. § 46-3-403(1) (explaining that a valid digital signature is "as valid, enforcea-
ble, and effective as if it had been written on paper"). Contra 15 U.S.C.S.
§ 7001(a) (1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2001) (stating only that an electronically signed doc-
ument "may not be denied legal effect").
178 See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text. By enacting a version of the
UETA, see UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-4-101 to 464-501 (Supp. 2000), the State of Utah
may have gone a long way in remedying the flaws of its Digital Signature Act. In fact,
though much of this Note portrays a philosophical struggle between the electronic
and digital signature models, time may show that a dual system (as Utah now has)
actually gives transacting parties the best of both worlds.
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